The flexible exchange rate: gain or loss to the United States by Darryl R. Francis
I AM PLEASED to have this opportunity to dis-
cuss with you some of the current issues in interna-
tional trade. Ia mparticularly interested in this topic
since the recent decision by President Nixon to sus-
pend dollar convertibility into gold is eliciting high-
pitched discussion in the world press and, even more
important, this decision has a serious impact on~ the
welfare of all consumers in the world.
Although international trade represents only four
or five per cent of the U.S. gross national product, its
impact on domestic welfare is much greater, and the
settlement of current problems and uncertainties will
be felt by all of us for a long time to come. As far as
Ia mconcerned, the agreement on an international
payments mechanism is of far greater importance
than the ten per cent surcharge, and consequently I
will address my remarks to that portion of the new
international economic policy.
First, I will discuss the functioning of the interna-
tional payments system; second, the historical events
leading to the current situation; third, the alternative
solutions available. Finally, I will indicate my choice
of an international payments mechanism.
The Benefit5 from Trading internationally
The United States can produce virtually any com-
modity and service that it currently consumes. Why,
then, do we engage in international trade and incur
the risks and crises that have plagued us for the past
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fifty years? The answer, of course, is that interna-
tional trade, like domestic trade, is profitable. It is
profitable in the sense that it increases the welfare of
trading countries,
The reason we buy an imported commodity is sim-
ply that we can purchase it cheaper abroad than
we can produce it domestically. We pay for our
imports by selling goods and services to foreigners
who \vill accept them only if our goods are cheaper
than the same goods produced by them. Therefore,
the citizens of both trading countries, given their
resources, can consume more goods and services than
they could in the absence of such trade.
The reasons for the relative price differentials are
varied — it may be productive efficiency or it may be
domestic demand conditions. What is important is that
the price of the delivered foreign commodity or serv-
ice is lower than the price of the same commodity
produced at home. Therein lies the benefit from inter-
national trade. If such benefit does not exist, trade
will not take place. Any artificial restrictions which
lower this price diflerential reduce the amount of
international trade and therefore the welfare gains
that may accrue.
The same reasoning applies to international capital
movements. We buy foreign capital goods or foreign
securities only if they promise a higher rate of return
than domestic ones. In that sense, a given amount of
resources increases our income and welfare. The
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country selling the securities benefits by attracting a
scarce resource to facilitate the efficiency of the pro-
ductive process.
What is important to remember throughout any dis-
cussion of international trade is that benefits accrue
from our ability to consume more; that is, from
imports of goods, services and securities.
The Mechanism of international Payments
Since gains fromn trade derive froni imports, why
don’t we keep imnporting as much as possible and
forget about exports, reserve balances, and various
exchange problems? Like everything else, imports
must be paid for, and exports are the ultimate means
of payment. But since the barter system is extremely
inefficient in individual transactions, we avoid the
item by item mnatching of imports and exports by
using the international payments mechanism, just as
we avoid the matching of goods and services in
domestic transactions \vith the use of money.
To demonstrate international payments, let’s as-
sume that I buy a Japanese radio for $30. I write a
check on my bank and send it to the Japanese ex-
porter who deposits the check in his bank and gets
Japanese money for it. If the Bank of Tokyo can find
an importer who wants $30 to buy something in the
United States, it will sell the draft to him and my $30
finds its way into the account of a U. S. exporter in
aU .S. bank. Under these circumstances, an import
was offset by an export, the quantity of dollars sup-
plied was equal to the quantity demanded, and the
price of the dollar — the exchange rate — remained
the same.
But what if the Bank of Tokyo cannot immediately
find an importer who wants to buy U. S. goods and
services? What can it do with my $30 check? At this
point we must specify the international payments
mechanism that is used by the United States and
Japan. There are three main payments systems that
have been used: the gold standard, the dollar or
sterling exchange standard, and a flexible exchange
standard.
On a true gold standard, the Bank of Tokyo will
sell my check to the Japanese central bank who, in
turn, will buy $30 worth of gold from the U. S. Treas-
ury. Thus, mny import of a radio was matched by an
export of gold. The exchange rate, which is fixed in
terms of gold, does not change.
If we are on a dollar exchange standard, as existed
until recently, the price of a dollar is fixed in terms
of gold and the prices of all other cunencies are fixed
in terms of the dollar. In order for the exchange rate
to remain constant, the supply of dollars created by
mny purchase must be matched by an equivalent
quantity demanded. Since central banks are com-
mitted to maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, in the
absence of private demanders of dollars the central
banks must buy and hold the $30, thus increasing
their foreign reserves.
A flexible exchange standard implies that the price
of the dollar will be determined by market forces
without officialintervention. In this instance, the Bank
of Tokyo would ofler my $30 on the exchange market.
If there are buyers of U. S. goods and services at
existing prices, the $30 will be purchased by them
and the exchange rate will not change. But if these
importers view U. S. prices as being too high, they
will offer less foreign currency for my $30 check and
the transaction will be consummated only at the
lower price of the dollar. Thus, my import is still
paid by an export, but only when accompanied by
a change in the exchange rate,
To summarize this illustration, my import of the
radio was paid for with either a gold export, aU .S.
liability that a foreign central bank is willing to hold,
or an export of U. S. goods and services.
It should be clear, however, that an excess of im-
ports over exports can be continued under a gold
standard only as long as our gold supply lasts. Sim-
ilarly, under the dollar exchange standard the excess
can continue only as long as foreigners are willing
to supply us with goods and services in exchange for
dollar accounts in U. S. banks. Since we desire imports,
what is there to prevent the United States from ex-
hausting its gold stock or prevent an ever increasing
accumulation of dollar balances by foreign central
banks? In other words, is there an adjustment mecha-
nism \vhich prevents permanent imbalance in trade and
possible breakdown of international economic rela-
tions? Let us examine the adjustment process in each
of the three paymnents systems I have outlined.
Adjustment Processes
The gold standard, if permitted to function, would
cause an export of gold in our Japanese radio example.
A decline in the U. S. gold stock will cause a contrac-
tion of money supply in the United States and a
decline in nominal income. Exactly the opposite will
occur in Japan. With U. S. income declining, and
Japanese income rising, our purchases of Japanese
goods will decline and our sales to Japan will increase.
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This xvould cause an elimination of any U. S. itnport
surplus.
Similarly, under the dollar exchange standard, the
accumulation of dollar balances by foreigners would
increase their reserves, which in turn, would lead to
an increase in their money supply and income level.
The opposite could happen here, and again our bal-
ance-of-payments deficit would be corrected.
The flexible exchange rate, as we have seen, would
tend to establish a balance between imports and ex-
ports by causing a decline in the price of the dollar
in terms of foreign currencies, which would make
foreign goods more expensive to us and our com-
modities cheaper to foreigners. This change in relative
prices would discourage our imports and encourage
our exports.
All three systems of international payments mechan-
isins facilitate trade, provide adjustments, and have
xvithin them necessary means for prevention of trade
breakdown. Two of theni do it with fixed exchange
rates, and one with a flexible rate. Thus, the question
arises as to what are the ultimnatc differences among
themn, and why should a person advocate one ex-
change rate system over another.
The nmajor difference is that within the fixed ex-
change schenmes — both the gold and the dollar ex-
change standards — the adjustments which are neces-
sary to maintain an equilibrium in the balance of
payments take place in the domestic economies in
the form of changes in price, income, and employ-
merit levels. In a flexible exchange rate mechanism,
the adjustment is in the form of changes of prices
and quantities of internationally-traded commodities,
and in the welfare aspects generated by the changes
of the terms of trade.
The adjustments required by a fixed exchange rate
system frequently conflict with domestic goals. Virtu-
ally all national governments have adequately demon-
strated that they are committed to the achievement
of stable conditions in domestic economic activity. In
our example, for instance, it is difficult to imagine
that, given an import balance, the United States would
he willing to permit the indicated contraction of do-
mnestic production with its inherent probability of
higher unemnployment. It is just as difficult to visualize
Japan deliberately submnitting to inflation because
their exports have exceeded their imports.
As a result of the strong desire for economic stabil-
ity at home, central banks have generally undertaken
policies which mitigate the adjustments necessary to
correct a disequiibriumn in international trade under
a system of fixed exchange rates. Such actions have
resulted in the development of persistent and funda-
mental trade deficits and surpluses. In turn, these
surpluses and deficits have produced crises requiring
periodic adjustnmcnts in the exchange rate, direct con-
trols, and other arbitrary impediments to international
trade.
A flexible exchange rate, on the other hand, does
not necessarily imply domestic fluctuations in income
and employment. It is, therefore, more likely to be
permitted to achieve the adjusuuents necessary for
the smooth functioning of international trade. In the
choice of difierent exchange rate systems, it seems to
me, the crux of the matter is not the ability of these
systems to make necessary adjustments; rather, given
the demonstrated political necessity of maintaining
full domestic production and employment, it is a
matter of which one will be permitted to do so.
Historical Background of the Present Crisis
I have sketched the various international payments
mechanisms and have indicated how equilibrium can
be achieved under several exchange rate standards. I
would like to turn no\v to the specific case of the U. S.
balance-of-payments difficulties and discuss historical
events leading to the “international monetary crisis”
oF 1971. In capsule formn the history of the U. S. bal-
ance-of-payments position is as follows.
From 1.790 to 1875, the United States was a net
importer of goods, services, and capital. A developing
economy provides good investment opportunities and
foreign capital flows in. This inflow financed the ex-
cess of merchandise inmports. As the economy nmatured
and the ratio of capital to other resources began to
grow, repayment of foreign loans, and eventually U. S.
foreign investment, began to take place. In the United
States this change occurred approximately in 1875,
and since that time we have been a net exporter of
capital and merchandise.
At the end of World War II, we emerged as virtu-
ally the only industrial country with its productive
capacity intact. In spite of the strong postwar domes-
tic demand, our relative prices were still lower than
those in foreign countries and our export balance
became very large. This excess of exports over im-
ports was financed by private and governmnent lending
and unilateral transfers. After 1950, U. S. private and
governmnent capital outflows began to exceed the ex-
ports of merchandise and services, thus supplying
more dollars to the foreign exchange markets than
foreign inmporters were willing to absorb. That is, since
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1950 the U. S. balance of payments on a liquidity
basis has been in deficit.
The international payments mechanism, as estab-
lished by the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944,
provided that countries can fix their exchange rates
either in terms of gold or in terms of the dollar. As
it turned out, the United States established the price
of the dollar in terms of gold at $35 per ounce and
most other countries defined the prices of their cur-
rencies in terms of the dollar. The exchange rates
were fixed by foreign central bank intervention in the
form of buying dollars when the price of the dollar
was falling in ternis of foreign currencies and selling
when the price of the dollar was rising. It isn’t difficult
to sec that a persistent deficit in the U. S. balance of
payments and a fixed dollar exchange rate could co-
exist only with the accumulation of dollar balances by
private foreigners and foreign central banks.
Until the latter half of the 196O’s the United States
experienced a significantly lower rate of inflation and
a lower amplitude of cyclical fluctuations than did
other major foreign economies. Therefore, the dollar,
as the most stable of all major currencies, was ex-
tensively used as an international means of payment.
A large portion of the deficit-induced dollar balances
were thus held willingly and provided a service as
international money.
During the late sixties, ho\vever, the U. S. balance
in goods and services began to decline while capital
outflows remained virtually constant, At the same
time, domestic mnonetary and fiscal policies resulted in
large decreases in the purchasing power of the U. S.
dollar, both domestically and internationally. Thus,
in world trade we had an increasing rate of dollars
being supplied and a reduced demand for them, and
under these circumstances something had to give.
With these developmnents in mind, let’s analyze our
position in the spring of 1971.
U, S. international Position in Spring 1971
1. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies since
1965 resulted in a rapidly rising price level and
growing expectations of inflation. Attempts to moder-
ate inflationary pressures by restrictive fiscal actions
in 1968 and restrictive monetary actions in 1969 were
reversed in 1970, eliminating any hope of quickly
achieving price level stability.
2. As a result, our imports continued to increase,
while our exports began to decline. A deteriorating
balance in goods and services, coupled with substan-
tial net investment in other countries and government
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expenditures abroad, meant an increase in the quan-
tity of dollars supplied without a corresponding in-
crease in demand.
3. The international price of the dollar could re-
main fixed only through sales of gold to foreigners or
through massive accunmulation of dollar balances by
foreign private individuals and central banks. Our
gold supply has dwindled to ‘$10 billion, and we svere
reluctant to permit its continued depletion. Dollar
accumulation by foreigners reached $45 billion by
March 31, 1971.
4. Foreign exchange dealers and owners of liquid
dollar balances, in anticipation of some kind of a
downward readjustment in the value of the dollar,
began converting dollar holdings into foreign curren-
cies. This forced foreign central banks to purchase
even larger amounts of dollar claims.
5. With these pressures increasing, and with no
hope for redress, Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium
announced that they would no longer purchase addi-
tional dollars, thus floating their currencies and per-
mitting themn to appreciate. Meanwhile, Switzerland
and Austria undertook outright revaluation by an-
nouncing that their central banks would continue to
purchase dollars, but only at a lower price.
6. Our deteriorating competitive position and re-
sulting reduction in the export surplus were contribut-
ing to unemployment in the United States.
Alternative Options Available
Given this situation, neither the United States nor
the nmajor trading countries which were running size-
able surpluses could continue under the existing fixed
exchange rate alignment. It was clear that the U. S.
dollar was overvalued with respect to many major
currencies and that the existing exchange rate mechan-
inn was prone to the development of persistent bal-
ance-of-payments deficits and surpluses. Any new
system wInch could remain viable for any length of
time would not only have to alleviate the U.S. defi-
cit, but also provide for a payments mechanism
which would inhibit the persistence of international
disequilibrium.
Three unilateral actions were available to the
United States: the establishment of import controls in
order to equalize exports and imports, the revalua-
tion of gold with the hope that other countries would
permit the exchange depreciation of the dollar, and
the suspension of dollar convertibility into gold, thus
subjecting the international value of the dollar to
market forces.
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Import controls, whether in the form of high tariffs
or of direct or exchange quotas, represent a type of
interference with consumer choice. As we have seen
earlier, the benefits fromn international trade are a
result of satisfying consumer preference for iniported
commodities and the consequent reallocation of re-
sources so as to increase the efficiency of the trading
economies. Arbitrary intervention with the consumer
preference pattern will reduce the total voimne of
trade and the benefits to be derived from it. The size
of this welfare loss is difficult to measure, but it is of
such magnitude that, even under the most trying cir-
cumstances, govermnents which are concerned with
the satisfaction of individual citizens’ \vants have un-
dertaken such measures only as a policy of last resort.
The revaluation of gold, in spite of its current men-
tion as a solution, does not produce the desired effects,
particularly \vhen it is unilateral. .ks we have seen,
exchange rates are fixed at their established parities
by central bank intervention, Devaluing the dollar in
terms of gold does not, by itself, realign exchange
rates and therefore neither improves the U.S. bal-
ance-of-payments position nor provides a payments
mechanism which will preclude persistent deficits or
surpluses.
The suspension of dollar convertibility into gold,
again, as a unilateral action, does not insure that the
dollar will float in response to market forces, We nmay
say that the dollar is floating and we may not inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market, but that does
not prevent foreign central banks from interfering
and fixing the dollar rate of their currencies at some
level desired by them.
It may be asked at this point, why then did the
President suspend the conversion of dollars into gold?
The answer is to be found in the huge dollar balances
accumulated by the central banks of surplus countries.
Without convertibility into gold, these balances can
only be used to buy U. S. goods and services. Since
the accumulation itself is a sign that at current
prices foreigners find it unprofitable to import fromn the
United States, the probability that they will con-
tinue to support the prevailing price of the dollar is
very small. This was already indicated by the revalua-
tion and fioatation of the currencies of several countries
which took place in May 1971. In addition, incon-
vertibility of the dollar into gold, in effect, removed
the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods agreements and
made some multilateral action imperative.
To sum up, unilateral actions on the part of the
United States, as economnically powerful as it may
be, either do not solve the current international eco-
nomic problems or are too costly to undertake and
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etiforce, What is required is a multilateral action of all
countries involved to realign the exchange rates andto
agree to a payments system which will provide enough
exchange rate flexibility to forestall another crisis such
as we face today.
Possible Choices of Payments Mechanisms
In vie\v of the discussion up to now and in view
of the sentiments expressed by international authori-
ties and the world press, we are left with two effective
possible payments systems: a multilaterally agreed
upon freely fluctuating exchange rate mechanism or a
niultilaterally established fixed exchange rate system
with readjusted par values and with somewhat greater
flexibility around par. I should like to discuss these in
reverse order.
Fixed exchange rate. A fixed exchange rate system
will require a negotiated realignment of exchange
rates. The events of the past few weeks demonstrate
the magnitude of the problem. Surplus countries all
appear to acknowledge the necessity of devaluing the
dollar. However, when it comes to a true commitment,
few countries wish to revalue their currencies to a
true market level at which their surpluses and our
deficits would be elinminated. In short, a surplus to
them at the expense of a deficit to the United States
is “fair.”
Given this attitude, it is difficult to conceive that
the governments involved would pursue the domestic
policies necessary for a fixed rate system to survive,
because fixed rates without balance-of-payments diffi-
culties require that each country maintain a rate of
domnestic economic growth approximately equal to
that of other countries. Significantly different growth
rates would again produce persistent balance-of-pay-
ments surpluses and deficits and would again lead
to exchange crises with all the losses of trade that
accompany them.
Increased flexibility around par will permit larger
deviations from a concerted rate of growth but will
not eliminate the possibility of some country being
temporarily successful in using foreign trade as a tool
of domestic policy. So long as such a possibility exists,
some govermiments will have the incentive to use this
politically expedient economic measure at the ex-
pense of welfare gains to their consumers.
Thus, even if a “correct” exchange realignment is
agreed upon, and the U.S. balance-of-payments prob-
lems are solved, the permanency of such a system is
very much in question. Of course, if the established
bands around par were very wide, and the par were
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would be removed. But then, of course, it would not
be a fixed rate system.
Freely fluctuating exchange rate. This leads us to
the commsideration of the freely fluctuating exchange
rate. I believe that such a system would best solve
current difficulties and would assure a permanent
exchange rate mechanism which should be free of the
type of trade slowdowns we are experiencing now.
Rates would respond to the forces of demand and
supply and accurately reflect the trading positions of
all nations. Unwanted accumulations of currencies
could not take place; there would be no developnment
of crises with their resultant losses. And, what is more
imnportant, all governments could pursue totally in-
dependent domestic policies without imposing their
excesses upon others.
An inflationary policy, for example, would cause
an increase in a country’s demand for imports and
a decline in its exports. Instead of running an
extended deficit and exporting its inflation, it will
find that the international value of its currency has
fallen and its import surplus is eliminated. Thus,
domestic excesses would have to be paid for at home.
I believe that the knowledge of this fact will prevent
the use of the international niarket for domestic goals.
Two major criticisms of the freely fluctuating ex-
change rate are most frequently voiced. First, because
of daily or conceivably even hourly fluctuations in the
rate, it is contended that the increase in uncertainty
will cause a reduction in the volume of trade, Sec-
ond, it is further contended that the freely fluctuating
rate will elicit trade restrictions and unbridled
speculation.
l’here is little doubt that continuous small changes
in the exchange rates would induce marginally greater
daily risks and therefore somewhat greater costs of
international currency convertibility. This is supported
by the sparse historical evidence and by the recent
behavior of the forward rate. The forward rate, which
among other things reflects the insurance premium
for delivery of some currency at a specified price at
some future date, has increased, Interestingly enough,
however, the increases are minimal where the float is
“clean” and large where central bank intervention is
either present or anticipated. TIns seems to indicate
that the actual flexibility is a small contributor to in-
creased costs, while intervention, or anticipated official
revaluations as exist under a fixed rate, is the real
culprit.
Most of our domestic conimnodity, stock and money
markets have hourly fluctuations and the premium
associated with frequent changes does not appear to
be prohibitive nor does it impair the efficiency of
these markets. Here too, large fluctuations in forward
prices occur when there are anticipations of some
natural disaster or a strike or some institutional inter-
ference, events not unlike anticipated changes in the
exchange rate.
The question that should be asked is not whether
convertibility costs are higher under a flexible ex-
change rate as compared svith the fixed rate, but
whether they are higher than the total trade costs of
periodic real or anticipated revaluations of the fixed
rate. Since 1944, out of 92 countries which have estab-
lished parities under the International Monetary Fund,
forty-five countries have changed par values seventy-
four times. Several of these changes were accompanied
by serious international economic disturbances, and
mnost of them by domestic problems of reallocation of
resources. Every sudden official change in the ex-
change rate causes a movement of resources between
export and import competing industries, and each
mnovement implies an increase in structural unemploy-
mnent. Consequently, the economic costs of a fixed
exchange rate system are sizeable. With a flexible
rate system, on the other hand, resources move grad-
ually and with a minimum of friction, resulting in
lower costs.
Similar remarks can be made about speculation,
an activity which stabilizes rather than destabilizes
prices. Destabilizing speculation, which everyone
fears, occurs as a result of anticipations of forces out-
side the normal economic realm. With freely fluctuat-
ing exchange rates, such forces are much less likely
to materialize than with a fixed rate system which
experiences periodic crises.
An interesting observation is that with fixed ex-
change rates and the associated central bank interven-
tion in exchange markets, a form of speculation is
performed by central banks rather than by those in-
clividuals who voluntarily bear the risks. Thus, the
risk of loss is borne by all taxpayers, xvhether they
want it or not.
As for the criticism that freely fluctuating exchange
rates will elicit trade restrictions greater than under
fixed rates, one simply has to look at the situation
which existed for the past 27 years. It really all
depends on what one means by trade restrictions. It
seems to me that arguing that a fluctuating rate will
lead to mnore restrictions is simply saying that where
disequilibrium fixed rates can no longer be used to
pursue domestic goals, alternative means may take
the form of new trade restrictions. In other words, a
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country, which for purposes of donmestic stabilization,
maintained an undervalued currency and an export
balance under a fixed rate system, will now have to
resort to other trade restrictions to achieve the same
goal. It is certainly not an inevitable consequence of
flexible rates, and in any case, it is only a different
manifestation of the same restrictive policy.
The usual example put forward is the economic
warfare of the early thirties. At that time there was
truly a proliferation of various international trade
barriers and for a while the British poumid was re-
moved from its convertibility imito gold. What these
critics fail to point out is that there was a world wide
depression under way and that the restraints began
to multiply in 1929 while the pound was not floated
until 1931. A causal relationship is cemtaiuly not
imidicated.
Conclusion
I believe that the freely fluctuating exchange rate
is far preferable to a fixed one. Whatever the costs
involved, they arc less than those imposed by the
present systemn. There is the chance now to establish
a mechanism whiclm prohibits the exchange exploita-
tion of one country by another and which therefore
has a better chance of long-run survival.
Froni reading the reports of time present interna-
tional economic “crisis,” one gets an impression that
the current decline in global trade is caused by the
so called “floating” of exchange rates. It is our view
that nothing can be further froni the truth. In the first
place, the crisis existed prior to the floating of the
rates and secondly, the rates are not being allowed
to float freely. The high risks \vhich are instrumental
in the decline of trade are not created by the flexibil-
ity of the exchange rate, but by the anticipations of
a new and unpredictable exchange rate fix.
Id onot believe that freely fluctuating exchange
rates will he agreed upon immediately. I would rather
expect that the first agreenment will produce ~ new
exchange rate realignment with wider bands around
the par. Then, the next inevitable crisis will add to it
a crawling peg. Fromu there it is only a small step to
the freely fluctuating exchange rate. So, in spite of all
the terrible disasters that are predicted for flexibility,
I believe that we may yet see an international pay-
meuts mnechanism which will utilize freely fluctuating
exchange rates and which will assure a maximum of
welfare without artificial obstructions.
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